![]() This doesn’t mean that the Pentagon should ignore the age-old wisdom - quoted in the defense strategy - that “the surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to win one.” That’s why the United States is making massive investments in these domains, as well as emergent fields. Furthermore, in this environment, hypersonic missiles, infrastructure-targeting cyber capabilities, or militarized quantum-based AIs are more likely to be decisive than infantry divisions. In this environment, conventional weapons are approaching a level of destructiveness that triggers the logic of mutual assured destruction - to say nothing of the possibility of mutual assured economic destruction. ![]() The emergence of new technologies - ubiquitous surveillance, anti-access/area denial systems, hypersonics, and cyber - has dramatically enhanced the destructive power of even conventional warfare. By single-mindedly preparing for the most dangerous course of action, especially in ways reliant on capabilities the nation simply no longer possesses, the Pentagon is failing to prepare for the wars America’s soldiers and marines are most likely to actually fight.Įven if a U.S.-China war did not lead directly to nuclear annihilation, it would be unimaginably destructive. To borrow the language of my Marine instructors at The Basic School, great-power war is the enemy’s most dangerous course of action, but low-intensity conflict driven by great-power competition is the enemy’s most likely course of action. Great-power competition, on the other hand, is likely to involve a new era of messy global entanglements, ranging from economic rivalry to intelligence operations to full-on proxy warfare and insurgency campaigns focused on the world’s most critical lines of communication. High-Intensity Conventional Maneuver War Is OutĪ great-power conflict today would involve high-intensity combat that would make World War II pale in comparison. Competing with China might include a great-power war in the Western Pacific - but it’s almost certainly going to consist of fighting proxy wars and insurgencies around the globe where American and Chinese interests clash. The problem is that the Pentagon is failing to make the critical distinction between preparing to win in traditional, conventional great-power conflict versus in great power competition. It correctly identifies China as the overriding strategic challenge for American interests. The problem is not that the defense strategy prioritizes interstate strategic competition over terrorism. It’s actually time to re-open and engage with the Counterinsurgency Field Manual to prepare for a future characterized by sophisticated, well-funded, and strategically targeted insurgency campaigns against the United States, its allies, and security partners. Unfortunately, that couldn’t be further from the truth. ![]() It feels like some leaders in the Department of Defense see China’s rise as heralding an end to fighting messy little wars in far-flung corners of the world. Mechanized warfare is back in - and low-intensity conflict, from grey-zone warfare to counter-insurgency, is going unmentioned and untrained.ĭriven by the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the Pentagon has seemingly shifted to single-mindedly preparing for a traditional, conventional great-power conflict it is unlikely to ever fight - while drastically decreasing training for the proxy wars, civil conflicts, and insurgencies it will inevitably be called upon to help win. This year, though, training was single-mindedly dedicated to conventional maneuver and combined arms - on a desert battlefield utterly devoid of simulated (or even notional) civilians. ![]() When I participated in the same exercise in 2015, sure we spent time assaulting Soviet doctrinal positions - but also days in a mock village with role players, working through the unique challenges of counter-insurgency. At the Marine Corps’ battalion-level integrated training exercise this past summer, I spent two weeks preparing for a mechanized desert war. It felt suspiciously like the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and not just because of the smell of baking fuel under the relentless sun at Twentynine Palms.
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